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In the past twenty years, there has been a sharp decline in party politics and the rise of what 
can best be described as a new form of populist politics. Nowhere has this trend been more 
evident than in Latin America in the 1990s, particularly in the Andean region.1 One common 
theme in this trend is the rise of leaders who denounce politics by attacking political parties as 
the source of corruption, social exclusion and poor economic management of the ancient 
regime. Alberto Fujimori in Peru in the 1990s and Hugo Chávez Frías since his surprising 
election in Venezuela in 1998 are prototypical examples of the rise of ‘anti-politics’, the 
emergence of ‘political outsiders’ who have mounted assaults on traditional politics, and the 
established political class, running in elections saying, ‘vote for us - we are not politicians!’ 
 
Populism refers to a political strategy where a leader appeals directly to ‘the people’, ‘the 
masses’ – or, in the language of today’s development discourse – ‘the poor’. They claim to 
love the people, to be the direct representative of the people, to be the voice of the people.2  
Populist leaders continually demonstrate their closeness to common people (el pueblo) and 
stimulate popular identification with their leadership. The leader-mass bond, in recent times, 
is harnessed through frequent face-to-face contacts with the masses, often through the use of 
television, and through other forms of mass media.  To some extent, populism is a form of 
cinematic politics.3  Populists generally communicate in ways that embody and live out the 
dreams of the common person, promise to promote policies that will include neglected groups 
in the polity and economy, and instil in their followers a sense of mission to transform the 
status quo.4 The maintenance of a populist’s popularity is, of course, dependent on drawing on 
the power of the leader’s charisma.5 
 
Populism, understood in political terms as the de-institutionalisation of political authority, 
emphasises the relatively insignificant role intermediary institutions like political parties, 
labour unions, the legislature, and so on, play in legitimating public authority and in executing 
public policies.  This political perspective has the advantage of not wedding populism to a 
particular stage of development, transitional phase, or economic strategy. 
Historical/sociological perspectives argue that classical populism in the 1930s and 1940s in 
Latin America corresponds to a transitional phase that involved the demise of oligarchic 
socio-political orders and the introduction of inclusionary mass politics, when urbanisation 
and industrialisation transformed the nature of political settlements. The rapidly growing 
urban and middle-classes were not easily absorbed into the rural-based patron-client networks 
of traditional oligarchic parties, and, in much of the region, they were available for 
                                                
1 K. Roberts, ‘Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case’, World 
Politics, 48:1 (1995). 
2 K. Weyland, ‘Clarifying a Constested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’, 
Comparative Politics (October 2001). 
3 I owe this point to James Putzel. 
4 Weyland (2001), p.5. 
5 A characteristic that Weber argued is essential to any politician.  
 2
mobilisation by populist figures such as Peron, Vargas and Cardenas.6  While dependency 
theorists did not adopt this functionalist approach, they identified populism as the emergence 
of multiclass political movements associated with the onset of import-substitution strategies 
(ISI) and nationalist-based state-led development strategies.7  More recently, populism had 
been defined as a set economic policies that aim to expand the fiscal spending through 
unselective distributive programmes aimed at rewarding labour unions, lower-income earners, 
and domestic industrialists, all of whom were important urban-based groups supporting 
populist governments.8  This so-called ‘macroeconomics of populism’ literature argued that 
populism generated unsustainable fiscal policies that were the root cause of growing fiscal 
deficits, inflation, and unsustainable debt portfolios in Latin America in the 1980s.   
 
All of these approaches predicted as well as advocated the demise of populism.  Those that 
emphasised populism as wedded to an economic stage saw populism as a transitional phase 
that would dissipate with the exhaustion of ISI.  Those that associated populism with fiscal 
profligacy argued that such policies were unsustainable, and that populism would thus wither 
under the mountain of debts and balance of payments crises. 
 
The re-emergence of new populist leaders in the 1990s has provided an opportunity to assess 
conventional theories of populism. Firstly, the new populist emerged in a different global 
environment, one where economic liberalism is considerably more dominant than in the past.  
Secondly, in contrast to classical populism, such as that Perón and Vargas, there is much less 
inclination of political outsiders to build party organisations as a basis of their rule.  The 
defining characteristic of anti-politics is anti-political party politics. Thirdly, there has been an 
interesting co-existence between anti-politics politicians promoting neo-liberal 
microeconomic agendas and combing this with fiscal discipline, and even austerity. These 
trends suggest that populism is not wedded to either a stage of development or a particular 
economic strategy. Moreover, while the political perspective on populism is essential for 
understanding new forms of populism, it dose not necessarily explain why or how some of the 
classical populists such as Perón, Vargas, Cárdenas and Betancourt combined personalist 
leadership with substantial forms of institution-building in the form of political parties and 
state-labour union links.9 
 
In Latin America, a great deal of attention has focused on the extent to which anti-politics and 
neo-liberal economic policy have been compatible in the 1990s.10  Fujimori and Menem were 
striking examples of the rise of anti-politicos pursuing neo-liberal development strategies.  
The affinity between new populism and neo-liberalism revolves around both movements’ 
                                                
6 G. Germani, T. di Tella & O. Ianni, Populismo y contadictiones de clase en Latino-américa, Mexico: Ediciones 
Era, 1973. 
7 F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979. 
8 R. Dornbusch & S. Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991. 
9 Roberts suggests that a synthetic construction of populism can be founded on the following five core principles 
that are derived from the competing perspectives: 1) a personalistic and paternalistic, though not necessarily 
charismatic, pattern of political leadership; 2) a heterogeneous, multiclass political coalition concentrated in 
subaltern sectors of society; 3) a top-down process of political mobilisation that either bypasses institutionalised 
forms of mediation or subordinates them to more direct linkages between the leader and the masses; 4)  an 
amorphous or eclectic ideology, characterized by a discourse that exalts subaltern sectors or is anti-elitist and/or 
antiestablishment; 5) an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create 
a material foundation for popular sector support (Roberts, 1995). 
10 K. Weyland, ‘Populism in the Age of Neoloberalim’, in M. Conniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America, 
University of Arizona Press, 1999; Roberts (1995). 
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adversarial relationship with the established political class, established intermediary 
organisations such as political parties, labour unions and business chambers.  Advocates of 
neo-liberal reform argued that poor groups were excluded from the benefits of ISI policies, 
which not only bred corruption, but also disproportionately favoured groups that had formal 
links with state-led strategies, and the rents and subsidies associated with state 
interventionism.  Moreover, state-created rents were not only unevenly divided but generating 
rent seeking and corruption, which, neo-liberals argued, were detrimental to economic growth 
and fiscal prudence. Economic liberalisation would limit the rent creation capacity of the 
state, and thus would undermine the effectiveness of influencing activities of interest groups 
associated with ISI.  In this perspective, neo-liberals opposed the influence of organised 
interests.  The neo-liberals’ objections to intermediary organisations were to permit neo-
populist leaders to invoke seemingly rational, technocratic arguments to strengthen their 
personal leadership. As Weyland notes: “They used neo-liberal policies to weaken labour 
unions and business groups, which had stalemated their predecessors”.11  Neo-liberal policies 
were thus instrumental in enhancing the power and legitimacy of anti-politicos. 
 
At the same time, new populists rose by attacking the political class who distributed privilege 
in ways that excluded the poor from development strategies.  Anti-politicos took advantage of 
the growing hostility of the vast majority of poor urban masses of the politics of privilege and 
corruption surrounding many failed state-led ISI strategies.  While there is little evidence that 
corruption itself either hinders growth, is necessarily exclusionary, or was any greater in the 
1990s compared with earlier periods, the prolonged economic stagnation in the 1980s and 
1990s in Latin America opened up a space for corruption to be used as a focal point for social, 
political and economic discontent. Neo-liberal populists such as Fujimori and Collor ran 
successful anticorruption campaigns that resonated with the poor.  This was reflected in the 
large shares among poor voters that both received in presidential elections.  These leaders ran 
as outsiders, creating the image that they were different from the established corrupt political 
class.  Both neo-liberalism and neo-populism shared hostility toward the political class. 
 
In terms of governing, neo-liberals and neo-populists shared a vision that a strong executive 
was necessary to override distributional coalitions within civil society, and within the state 
bureaucracy and within political parties. The ease with which Fujimori shut down Congress 
and weakened the judiciary, and allied with the military suggest that many groups in society 
bought into the idea that established intermediary Fiscal austerity measures were crucial to 
neo-populists because the reductions in inflation, and subsequent price stability was a 
principal part of the regime’s legitimacy.  This was particularly the case where previous 
episodes of hyperinflation both hurt the poor greatest and was the source of economic 
instability and capital flight.  Finally, the use of targeted subsidy programmes to poor groups 
(used extensively by Fujimori) was advocated by neo-liberals and helped neo-populist 
establish direct clinetelist links, which enhanced loyalty of the masses. 
 
In the cases where neo-liberal neo-populists did emerge, in Latin America at least, they did so 
in the wake of episodes not only due to prolonged economic stagnation, but also where prior 
episodes of hyperinflation decimated the legitimacy of the established political leaders and 
parties.  Moreover, the cases of Fujimori, Mellor and Menem were decidedly conservative 
with respect to the property rights and privileges of upper income groups, and in particular, 
asset owners. There was little attempt to increase direct taxation on upper-income groups;12 
                                                
11 Weyland (1999), p.184. 
12 V. Tanzi, ‘Taxation in Latin America in the last decade’, Working Paper 76, Stanford: Center for Research on 
Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University, 2000. 
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privatisation programmes often benefited well-placed business groups;13 income distribution, 
if anything, worsened; land reform was largely ignored; and there was little resistance to keep 
strategic national industries in the hands of the state.  These cases did not represent significant 
political inclusion of lower-income groups, and were hardly transformative in terms of social 
relations of production.  Their lack of revolutionary intent, perhaps more than anything, made 
these movements transitory and increasingly illegitimate over time.  Fujimori, Menem, and 
Collor all left office in disgrace, subjects themselves, ironically, of large-scale corruption 
charges, and other abuses of power.  The failure of these projects to distribute wealth proved 
their Achilles heel, particularly because trend increases in economic growth and investment 
were not sustained. 
 
The affinity of neo-liberalism and neo-populism is, however, a trend that does not cover every 
case in Latin America. While many neo-populists in Latin America did follow neo-liberal 
policies, there is no reason to argue that there is a determinant relationship between the re-
emergence of anti-politics and the economic and political strategies. In one of the classical 
studies of populism, Laclau posited the largely unpredictable nature of populist movements; 
and rejected the mechanical connection between populism and the stage of development.14 
 
In December 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías, a former lieutenant colonel and leader of two failed 
two coups attempts in 1992, won a landslide victory in the presidential elections.  His rise to 
power effectively marked the end of a political system where political pacts and corporatist 
bargaining had produced one of the most stable democratic systems in Latin America in the 
previous forty years. The cornerstone of the pacted democracy was the Pacto Punto Fijo, 
which was characterised by the alternation of power of two political parties, the social 
democratic Acción Democratica (AD) and the centre-right Social Christian Party (COPEI).  
Neither Chávez, who won 56 percent of the vote, nor Henrique Salas Romer, who finished 
second with 40 percent, was the nominee of either of the main parties (although Romer 
received the endorsement of two main parties). 
 
The rise of anti-politics in the Venezuelan case in the period 1998-2004 represents important 
differences with contemporary patterns in Latin America, as well as a break with Venezuela’s 
recent past.  One of the hand, Chávez is a consummate anti-politico. The anti-party, anti-
corruption discourse is central to his popularity, particularly among the poor.  From the 
beginning of his career Chávez cultivated an anti-party discourse.  He aggressively denounced 
the hegemony of the two main parties, and their domination of Congress, the judicial system, 
and the labour and peasant movements.  In this sense, he was similar to many neo-liberal 
analysts that had argued that Venezuelan economic and political crisis was due to the capture 
of the state by clientelist and increasingly corrupt parties – a system that was referred to as a 
“partyarchy”.15 Upon winning the election, he followed through on his campaign promise of 
transforming the nation’s corporatist system through a constituent assembly.16  The drafting of 
a new constitution in 1999 attempted to create direct, participatory democracy at the local 
level.  The changes Chávez promised and executed severely weakened the power of the 
legislature and judiciary.  The increase in executive power led many to call his regime ‘hyper-
                                                
13 H. Schamis, H., ‘Distributional Colaitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America’, World 
Politics, 51:2 (1999). 
14 E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism, London: New Left Books, 
1977. 
15 M. Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
16 J. McCoy, ‘Chávez and the End of “Partyarchy” in Venezuela’, Journal of Democracy, 10:3 (1999). 
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presidentialist’, although Latin American politics, and Venezuela in particular, has 
traditionally been presidentialist in any case.17 
 
On the other hand, while the anti-party discourse is similar to other Latin American cases, the 
chavismo movement evolved in ways that differ substantially from other Latin American 
cases.  Firstly, the appeal of Chávez owes to the resonance of his anti-neo-liberal discourse 
and policies; and his foreign policy rhetoric, which called for the strengthening of developing 
country alliances and the need to create ‘multi-polar’ centres of power in the world.  On 
foreign policy, Chávez opposed the US line on many issues, including maintaining 
particularly friendly relations with Cuba, and granting asylum to Colombian guerrillas.  
Chávez directly attacked not only the political class, but also attacked the economic oligarchy 
as an enemy of the people – in his often used quote, “horrór a la oligarquía.”  Chávez also 
reversed the process of privatisation of the oil industry, which accounts for three-quarters of 
Venezuela’s exports; and gradually eliminated the independence of the Central Bank. The 
introduction of capital controls in 2003, in the wake of a two-month oil strike, also contrasts 
with neo-liberal policy. Thus, one of the salient characteristics of the rise and rule of chavismo 
is a reversal of neo-liberal policies. The second aspect chavismo is the politicisation of social 
and economic inequality.18 While Chávez has had little support among labour unions, the 
prominence of agrarian reform in his electoral platform and during the period 2000-2004 
represents a radicalisation of property-rights transformation not seen in other Latin American 
cases. Moreover, the introduction of government missions that redistribute social spending to 
the poorest groups, and the virulence of the opposition of middle-class and upper-class 
groups, and the media – controlled by established, large economic groups – to a series of 
Chávez’s political and economic reforms in the period 2001-2004, attests to the extent to 
which the privileged groups’ rights and access to the state where under threat.  The politically 
more radical stance of Chávez’s administration points to the role of ideas and ideology in 
influencing the extent to which struggles over property rights can be transformed.  Thirdly, 
the Chávez period attests to the relatively greater role the military plays in executive-led 
social and economic programmes and management.  The re-emergence of the military has 
little parallel among other anti-politico cases, though the military was a strong ally of 
Fujimori.  Finally, the durability of Chávez’s support among the poor, despite economic 
stagnation and crippling opposition-led strike in 2002 and 2003, differs substantially from the 
other Latin American cases of anti-politics.  The consolidation of the Chávez regime in 
September 2004, with an overwhelming victory in a recall referendum demanded by the 
opposition, attests to the solidity of Chávez’s support. The popularity of Menem and Fujimori 
were based largely on controlling hyperinflation and reviving economic growth.  There 
support proved ephemeral in the wake of economic downturns.  The extent to which chavismo 
will represent an enduring path change in property rights and in economic performance will, 
as the history of developmental states attests, depend upon the ability of the regime to 
institutionalise many of the reforms and initiatives undertaken. 
 
This paper examines the political economy underlying the rise of Hugo Chávez Frías and the 
accompanying replacement of a party-centred system with a more personalistic/partyless 
populism in the period 1998-2004. The first section examines the pre-conditions that created 
the opportunity for a political outside to emerge in Venezuela. In particular, it explores the 
mechanisms through which economic liberalisation policies contributed to increasing political 
                                                
17 S. Mainwairing & M. S. Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
18 K. Roberts, ‘Social Polarization and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela’, in S. Ellner & D. Hellinger (eds.), 
Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
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instability, the decline in the fundamental political party, the increase in resonance of anti-
party and anti-corruption discourses, and the social and economic polarisation and inequality.  
The second section examines the ideological background behind Chávez and his movement.  
The third section provides a historical account of how Chávez has exercised power, and 
explores, in particular the mechanisms through which the politics of anti-politics operates.  
The rise of hyper-presidentialism, the change in the Constitution, the role of neighbourhood 
community cells known as Bolivarian Circles, and the growing role of the military will be 
traced. The increasing factionalism within chavismo’s main political organisation 
(Movimiento Quinta República, MVR) will be assessed. The fourth section examines 
economic policy and outcomes.  In particular, the legitimating role of executive-led missions 
to support social programmes, agrarian reform, and battle over the state oil company-PDVSA, 
will be explored. 
 
 
Pre-Conditions for the Rise of Anti-Politics  
Economic Liberalisation, Economic Crisis and Growing Inequality in Venezuela, 1988-
199819 
The space for the rise of anti-politics lies in the inability of the traditional political parties and 
the state to govern the economy in ways that promoted economic growth.  In the period 1958-
1988, the Venezuelan polity had historically been legitimated by the state-led 
developmentalism and economic nationalism,20 with centralised rent-deployment patterns 
controlled by the executive and brokered by two hegemonic and highly centralised and 
clientelist political parties.  The declining effectiveness of state-led industrialisation 
contributed to declining growth rates and balance-of-payments crises, which influenced the 
decision of Carlos Andres Pérez to launch one of the most ambitious liberalisation reforms in 
Latin America. The liberalisation plan, known as the ‘Great Turnaround’ (‘El Gran Viraje’) 
included the unification, and massive devaluation of the exchange rate, trade liberalisation, 
privatisation and financial deregulation, including freeing of interest rates, elimination of 
nearly all restrictions on foreign investment, and the introduction of tax reforms, including the 
introduction of value-added taxes.21 The programme was intended to be an orthodox reform 
package along the lines of the Washington Consensus.22 However, the introduction of neo-
liberal economic reforms in 1989 failed to reverse a long-run trend decline in growth from the 
1960s and substantially increased economic and social polarisation in the country.  Indeed, the 
introduction of economic reforms in Venezuela in 1989 ushered in a period of profound 
political instability, growing polarisation and income inequality, and contributed to the demise 
of once stable and power political parties.23 In many ways, Venezuela was an unlikely 
candidate for political and economic implosion. Firstly, in the period 1958-1988, Venezuela 
maintained, through political pacts and corporatist bargaining, one of the most stable 
                                                
19 Draws substantially on J. Di John, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Liberalisation in Venezuela’, Crisis 
States Working Paper, 46, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2004. 
20 F. Coronil, The Magical State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
21 For details, see R. Hausmann, ‘Quitting Populism Cold Turkey’, in L. Goodman et al. (eds.), Lessons from the 
Venezuelan Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; J. Corrales & I. Cisneros, 
‘Corporatism, Trade Liberalization and Sectoral Responses: The Case of Venezuela, 1989-1999’, World 
Development, 27 (1999); M. A. Rodríguez, El Impacto de la Política Económica en el Proceso de Desearollo 
Venezolano, Caracas: Universidad Santa Maria, 2002. 
22 J. Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in J. Williamson (ed.), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990. 
23 For a more extensive discussion of these political economy of these reforms, see Di John (2004). 
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democratic systems in Latin America.24 Thus, crisis and breakdown in Venezuela have 
occurred in a polity that had accumulated substantially strong mechanisms to regulate and 
contain conflict. Secondly, Venezuela was for six decades before 1980 the second fastest 
growing economy in Latin America and the economy with the lowest inflation rate, the latter 
a sign of a polity that contains and regulates conflict. Given its favourable initial conditions, 
the Venezuelan case may prove to be an instructive case as to the stresses liberalisation can 
unleash not only in transition economies,25 but also in a late-developing, capitalist, and long-
standing democratic polity. 
 
There are several political economy trends that contributed to the decline in the legitimacy of 
the political parties. The first concerns the long-run decline in economic growth and 
investment. Despite maintaining relatively high growth rates in gross domestic product in the 
period 1920-1980, and despite being the recipient of oil export windfalls in the period 1974-
1985, Venezuela entered one of the worst growth implosions in Latin America in the period 
1980-1998. Per capita gross domestic product declined 2.7 percent in the liberalisation period, 
1990-1998.26  As indicated in Table 1, the growth performance of the Venezuelan economy 
not only exhibits an implosion of growth in the period 1980-1998, it also exhibits a marked 
long-run decline in the trend rate of growth in the non-oil and manufacturing sectors in the 
period 1965-1998 when compared with the prior period of 1920-1965. 
 
Table 1: Growth Trends in the Venezuelan Economy, 1920-1998 
(Average Annual Growth Rates,* %) 
Source: A. Baptista, Bases cuantitativas de la economía venezolana 1830-1995, Caracas: Fundación Polar, 1997; 
BCV, Annual Reports and Statistical Series, Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, various years. 
 
 Non-oil GDP Manufacturing 
1920-30 10.2 n.a.
1930-40 2.7 n.a.
1940-50 9.6 6.6
1950-57 9.1 15.0
1957-65 3.4 8.5
1965-80 5.7 5.8
1980-90 -0.1 4.3
1990-98 2.3 1.5
* All output series in 1984 bolivares 
 
Manufacturing growth, which had been on a downward trend since the mid-1960s, declined 
from an annual average of 4.3 percent in the period 1980-1990 to 1.5 percent in the reform era 
of 1990-1998, and collapsed to minus 5 percent in the period 1998-2002. Non-oil annual 
growth did increase from minus 0.1 percent in the period 1980-1990 to 2.3 percent in the 
period 1990-1998. 
 
                                                
24 D. Levine, Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973; T. L. 
Karl, ‘Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela’, in G. O’Donnell, P. C. 
Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986; J. C. Rey, ‘La Democracia Venezolana y La Crisis del Sistema Populista de Conciliación’, Estudios 
Políticos, 74 (October-December 1991). 
25 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
26 For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the economic liberalisation package launched in 1989, see Di John, 
(2004). 
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Moreover, there was continued decline in total investment and particularly private sector 
investment, as indicated in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Gross Fixed Investment Rates, Venezuela (1950-1998) 
(Annual average as percentage of GDP and non-oil GDP respectively in current prices, %) 
Source: Baptista (1997); BCV, Annual Reports, various years; BCV, Statistical Series in Venezuela in the Last 
Fifty Years (Series Estadisticas de los Ultimos Cincuenta Años), Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 1992; 
OCEI, Encuesta Industrial, Caracas: Republic of Venezuela, various years. 
 
All investment 
(as % GDP) 
Non-oil investment 
(as % non-oil GDP)  
Total Public Private Total Public Private 
1950-60 27.7 10.5 17.2 34.8 16.9 17.8
1960-70 24.2 8.4 15.8 26.1 9.1 17.0
1970-80 34.4 10.8 23.6 36.8 9.6 27.2
1980-90 21.3 10.6 10.7 22.5 8.7 13.8
1990-98* 15.8 9.9 6.9 13.7 5.6 8.1
* Non-oil investment data for the period 1990-95 only 
 
Investment rates, particularly private investment rates, in the 1990s were significantly lower 
than in any period since 1950. The non-oil public investment rates in the 1990s were also 
lower than at any period since 1950, which also suggests that the effectiveness of the state in 
mobilising resources did not increase as a result of economic reforms. Reducing the role of 
the state in the economy has not, in the Venezuelan case, led to a more secure environment in 
which to invest. 
 
The socio-economic and political effects of long-run economic stagnation have been dramatic 
and devastating. Stagnation in growth has negatively affected the demand for labour. Firstly, 
there were important increases in unemployment rates, especially since the mid-1980s. In the 
period 1965-1983, unemployment rates steadily fell and averaged 7.4 percent. From 1984-89, 
annual average unemployment rates rose to 10.5 percent and rose further to 11.5 percent in 
1990-99. Not only has economic liberalisation not increased the incentives to generate 
investment and employment, but also there appears to be a tendency of further deterioration as 
the end of the period (1996-99), which has seen average unemployment rates increase above 
trend to 13.5 percent.27 Secondly, there has been a dramatic decline in average real wages, 
which in 1995 had already fallen below the levels attained in 1950.28 Thirdly, the percentage 
of households below the poverty line was 36 percent in 1985-86; but increased to 42 percent 
in 1989-90; 51 percent in 1994-95; and 56.4 percent in 1998-2000.29 
 
While investment has stagnated, there has been a massive shift in the factor distribution of 
income in favour of profits and away from wages.  The principal decline in labour’s factor 
share occurs in the liberalization period, 1989-1998, as indicated in Table 3: 
 
 
                                                
27 Unemployment data are from OCEI, Encuesta de Hogares (Household Survey) and Employment Surveys, 
Caracas: Republic of Venezuela, various years; and Baptista (1997), Table I.4, p. 31. 
28 Baptista (1997), Table IV-1, p.145 
29 G. Marqéz & C. Alvarez, Poverty and the Labour Market in Venezuela, Washington DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1996.  
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Table 3: Net Factor Distribution of National Income in Venezuela, 1950-1990 
Source: BCV, Statistical Series, various years 
 
 
 
Share of wages and salaries 
in national income (annual 
average, percent) 
Share of corporate profits, 
dividends, rents and 
interest payments in 
national income (annual 
average percent) 
1950-1960 47% 53% 
1960-1970 46% 54% 
1970-1980 49% 51% 
1980-1988 46% 54% 
1989-1998 36% 64% 
 
The share of corporate profits, rents and dividends oscillated between 51 percent and 54 
percent in the period 1950-1988.  However, in the liberalisation period of 1989-1998, capital 
owners appropriated an annual average of 64 percent of national income.  Despite the fact that 
capitalist surplus appropriation and rents were increasing, private-sector investment rates 
declined in the 1990s. In fact, much of the increased surplus appropriation went abroad as 
accumulated capital flight, which reached $14 billion in the period 1994-2000. Capital flight 
was nearly the same as the accumulated surplus in the current account of the balance-of-
payments ($15 billion) in the same period.30 
 
While liberalization has been associated with a dramatic decline in labour’s factorial share, it 
is not possible to conclude definitively that liberalisation caused this decline. There are, as 
Rodríguez points out, important feedback effects to consider.31  On the one hand, labour 
unions had weakened prior to the liberalisation period.  In 1975, the rate of unionisation was 
33 percent, but fell to 26.4 percent by 1988 owing to economic stagnation and decline.  
Moreover, the ties between the main labour-based party, AD and the main labour federation 
(the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, CTV) weakened throughout the 1980s.32 
Labour’s weakened political power contributed to the decline in its bargaining power over 
factorial shares. One the other hand, the liberalisation policies clearly exacerbated this trend as 
lower factor shares along with weak demand for labour owing to stagnant investment further 
weakened labour’s power. In the period 1988-1995, the rate of unionisation fell by nearly 50 
percent, declining from 26.4 percent of the workforce in 1988 to 13.5 percent in 1995.33 
 
Accompanying the decline in labour union membership was an increase in informal 
employment in the liberalisation period. In the period 1980-90, the rate of informal 
employment of the non-agricultural labour force averaged 39.5 percent.  However, the level of 
informal employment increased to an average of 44.5 percent in the period 1991-95, with a 
tendency towards continued increases as the sub-period 1994-95 saw informality rates reach 
an average of 48.5 percent.34 The consequence of growing fragmentation and informalisation 
of the labour and production process negatively affected the social bases of support for 
political parties, and hence contributed to the de-institutionalisation of conflict mediation 
capacities in the Venezuelan polity. It also meant that populist/outsider strategies become 
                                                
30 Rodríguez (2002), p.67. 
31 F. Rodríguez, ‘Factor Shares and Resource Booms: Accounting for the Evolution of Venezuelan Inequality’, 
WIDER Working Paper, 205. Helinski: WIDER, 2000, pp.35-36. 
32 Roberts (2003), pp.60-61. 
33 Roberts (2003), p.61, using data from International Labour Organisation. 
34 Based on data from OCEI, Household Surveys and Employment Surveys, various years. 
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more likely to be effective political strategies. It is perhaps no accident that the two 
subsequent political leaders – Caldera and Chávez – relied on anti-politico/outsider discourses 
and less on the corporatist modes of intermediation that characterised Venezuela’s pacted 
democracy in the past. 
 
The decision of the two main parties, AD and COPEI, and the national labour union, CTV, to 
support the elimination of system of severance pay in 1997 had significant political 
repercussions.  This reform was one of the policies pushed by neo-liberal reformers and was 
associated with policies advocated by the Washington Consensus.  According to this 
arrangement, a worker’s last monthly salary and period of time on the job determined the 
level of severance pay.  Retroactivity dated back to the 1936 Labour Law, widened in scope 
over time, and became a symbol of the social democratic ideals of the pacted democracy. The 
Labour Reform of 1997, which eliminated retroactivity, generated a great loss in legitimacy 
for the parties and labour unions; the chavista movement referred to the reform as a national 
betrayal.35  
 
The worsening of distribution contributed to the growing polarisation of politics. Such 
divisiveness was manifested in increasing factionalism within and between the political 
parties, and declining support among the poor for economic reforms.36 The severity of the 
growing polarisation was manifested in the widespread support among the poor for two 
military coup attempts in 1992, the first of which was the military rebellion of Hugo Chávez, 
whose popularity was based on the stressing injustices of the neo-liberal model.37 The attempt 
to capture the presidential palace failed, and Chávez surrendered. However, he appeared on 
television urging fellow conspirators to lay down their arms. “Comrades”, he said on 
television, “unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives we have set ourselves have not been 
achieved in the capital”.  The phrase ‘for the moment’, por ahora, caught the popular 
imagination.  The aims of the rebellion had not been secured, but many people thought 
Chávez would return to the struggle at a later date.  Por ahora became Chávez’s slogan, and 
the red beret of the parachute regime his log.38  
 
Growing inequality was also the focal point of Rafael Caldera’s famous speech in Congress in 
1992 where he condemned the actions of the coup plotters, but emphasised that the discontent 
of the military officers was a fair reflection of the injustices of the neo-liberal programme. 
This speech revived Caldera’s political image (he was president in the period 1968-1973).  
Caldera, a founding member of COPEI, split from his party (which did not nominate him for 
the presidential elections in 1993) and re-invented himself as an ‘outsider’, running on a 
campaign focusing on anti-corruption and anti-neoliberal slogans. Caldera went on to win the 
1993 election, allied with a plethora of minor and emerging parties under loose coalition 
known as Convergencia.   The decision of Caldera not to accept his nomination loss within 
                                                
35 S. Ellner, ‘Organized Labor and the Challenge of Chavismo’, in Ellner & Hellinger (2003). 
36 Roberts (2003). Naím explains political instability in terms of the failure in the communication strategy of the 
Pérez administration to inform the poor and middle class the benefits of reform (M. Naím, Paper Tigers and 
Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela’s Economic Reforms, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment Book, 
1993).  This line of reasoning underestimates the distributional impact the liberalisation model itself. Polling 
evidence from the period 1989-1991 suggests that the poor strata were much less likely to support the reforms 
than upper income groups (Roberts, 2003, p.63). 
37 For evidence on the poor’s support for the military coup as well as their continued support for Chávez in the 
period 1992-2000, see D. Canache, ‘From Bullets to Ballets: The Emergence of Popular Support for Hugo 
Chávez’, Latin American Politics and Society, 44 (2002). 
38 R. Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela, London: Verso, 
2000. 
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COPEI represents an important turning point as to the capacity of the main political parties to 
maintain discipline among their militants and leaders. 
 
It is interesting to note that while neo-liberalism became associated in Venezuela with a 
worsening of income distribution, in the period 1970-1990 Venezuela had among the least 
unequal distributions of income in Latin America: only Uruguay, Costa Rica and Peru were 
less unequal.39 However, in the period 1990-1997, the growth in income inequality in 
Venezuela was the fastest in the region.40 In comparative terms, the growth in inequality was 
perhaps more destabilising politically in Venezuela than in other reformers where the 
initiation of reforms began with among the highest levels of income inequality, such as in 
Brazil, Chile or Mexico. In the latter countries, there was little scope for income distribution 
to worsen further. This suggests that rapid increases in income inequality matter more for 
instability than initial levels of inequality (Brazil and Chile have had much higher levels of 
income inequality yet have proven much more stable politically). Moreover, increases in 
inequality may have paved the way for more radical, nationalistic political outsiders because 
anti-neoliberal platforms and policies resonate more in polities where changes in distribution 
are recent.   
 
 
Neo-Liberal Reforms, Corruption and Political Instability41 
Apart from the decline in growth, and increase in inequality, the liberalisation period also 
produced uncertainty and political tension, and increased in the perception that corruption had 
worsened. These factors contributed to the loss in legitimacy of the two main parties, but 
particularly the fundamental party, AD.42 The sudden deregulation led to a frenzy of what 
Naím refers to as “oligopolistic wars” among business groups vying for control over raw 
material supplies, financing, and distribution channels.43 The rapid dismantling of trade 
protection and a decline in state-business cooperation had no counterpart in trust and ‘social 
capital’ of inter-conglomerate networks. In the context of weak judicial and regulatory 
mechanisms, these wars turned into nasty battles undertaken in the media as business groups 
aggressively invested in newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations. According 
to Naím and Francés, there reached a point where no major media enterprise was independent 
from a major private conglomerate group.44 The limited social capital of business groups 
clearly intensified a ‘war of positions’ within the private sector that added greatly to the 
atmosphere of political and social instability that marked the liberalisation era of the 1990s. 
                                                
39 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Development Beyond Economics, Washington DC: IABD, 2000, 
p.6. 
40 M. Székely & M. Hilgert, ‘The 1990s in Latin America: Another Decade of Persistent Inequality’, Inter-
American Development Bank Working Paper, Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Research 
Department, 1999. 
41 Draws substantially on Di John (2004). 
42 A ‘fundamental party’ (a term coined by Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Fragile democracy and schizophrenic liberalism: 
exit, voice and loyalty in the Andes’, draft paper presented to the Crisis States Programme workshop, 
Johannesburg, July 2003) can be viewed as the natural governing party (in terms of electoral success) as well as 
the party whose mobilisations and strategies were central to regime founding. The justification for referring to 
Accíon Democrática as a fundamental party in the period 1958-1993 is based on the following: a) AD never 
yielded its position in this period as the single biggest party in the either the House of Representatives or Senate; 
and b) AD won 5 of the 7 presidential elections. 
43 Naím (1993), pp.95-100. 
44 M. Naím & A. Frances, ‘The Venezuelan Private Sector: From Courting the State to Courting the Market’, in 
Goodman et al. (1995). 
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Neo-liberalism, if anything, created the setting for increases in mafia-like activity to 
appropriate the large rents that suddenly emerged with deregulation. 
 
The manner in which economic liberalisation was introduced also destabilised the polity. 
Pérez, elected in a landslide, had been president in the period 1974-1979, and many voters 
associated him with a period of prosperity and state largesse. Neither Pérez nor his party, AD, 
stressed during the campaign that rapid and profound reforms were planned, though there 
were policy documents that indicated that some market reforms would be initiated.45  By 
‘hiding’ his policy intentions, Pérez was one among many ‘first generation’ reformers in Latin 
America, such as Salinas in Mexico, Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentina, that 
introduced economic reforms in the early-1990s despite running a campaign that ‘hid’ policy 
reform intentions. This misrepresentation of policy intention during the campaign – 
essentially deceiving the electorate – was to prove damaging to the long-standing consultation 
process in the Venezuelan polity.46 
 
Hiding reform intentions exacerbated the ‘shock’ to the public when economic liberalisation 
therapy was actually introduced. A few weeks after the announcement of reforms, Venezuela 
experienced its bloodiest urban riots since urban guerrilla warfare in the 1960s.  The riots, 
known as the ‘Caracazo’, occurred in late-February 1989.  A doubling of gasoline prices, 
which were passed on by private bus companies, induced the outbursts. The government had 
actually announced that bus fares were allowed to rise by 30 percent, but did not monitor the 
increases bus companies were charging.  Moreover, bus drivers ignored discounts to student 
prices.47 The riots that ensued were contained by a relatively undisciplined military response 
that left more than 350 dead in two days. Although never documented, there are many 
informal accounts that point to left-wing organisations that mobilised groups to incite riots 
when gas prices were increased.48 
 
The way in which liberalisation reforms were decided was also divisive. Pérez decided to 
completely abandon consultations with large rival factions within his party, AD, and 
introduced reforms by relying on insulated technocratic decision-making. Since 1958, 
Venezuela’s democracy had been consolidated around a series of political pacts that relied on 
consensus building among the main political parties, labour unions and business associations. 
Two-thirds of cabinet ministers were from outside the governing political party, a move that 
created resentment and opposition in the legislative assemblies, including within AD.49 
Moreover, Pérez and his ministers’ discourse were confrontational and insulting to anti-Pérez 
factions within AD. Miguel Rodriguez, the Planning Minister, labelled reform critics as 
“dinosaurs”, “unadapted”, “cowards” and “unschooled”, and Pérez did little to dissociate 
himself from such remarks.50 Such a discourse contributed to the ‘activation of boundaries’ 
between the self-proclaimed ‘modern’ reformers and the ‘backward’ old guard of the political 
parties.  The creation and activation of boundaries contribute to the escalation of political 
                                                
45 A. Stambouli, La política extraviada, Caracas: Fundación para la Cultura Urbana, 2002, pp.175-176. 
46 The second major policy switch in the period under study occurred in 1996 when Rafael Caldera, who won the 
Presidency in 1993 running on an anti-corruption, anti-neoliberal campaign, abandoned two years of price and 
capital controls and endorsed the Agenda Venezuela, a structural adjustment package with IMF support.  The 
policy switch did only not reverse economic stagnation, it led to a further disillusionment with the party system 
and a deterioration of state institutions and public services (M. López Maya, ‘Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement 
and His Presidency’, in Ellner & Hellinger (2003), p.83).   
47 J. Corrales, Presidents without Parties, University Park: Penn State Press, 2002, p.51. 
48 Interviews with military officers and leaders of the Bolivarian Circles (June 2003). 
49 Stambouli (2002), pp.179-180. 
50 Corrales (2002), p.122. 
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conflict and violence.51 The break with pact making and consultation exacerbated the 
emerging factionalism between and within political parties and was largely responsible for the 
adversarial executive-party relations in the first three years of reform, and the massive 
increase in corruption scandals and accusations in the period.52 As a result, political instability 
and investment risks increased. 
 
One way to gauge the increase in conflict is to examine inflation levels, which reflect 
increases in the intensity of distributive struggles and the increasing inability of the state to 
manage such conflicts.53 While Venezuela’s inflation rates have been relatively low by Latin 
American standards throughout, as indicated in Table 4, the rises in the 1980s and 1990s were 
significant in terms of the country’s own record of low inflation: 
 
Table 4: Inflation Rates in Latin America, 1960-2002 
(Average, annual change, %) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank, various years 
 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-98 1998-2002
Average 14.4 72.0 223.0 253.0 9.6
Venezuela 1.0 6.6 23.0 50.1 23.4
Argentina 22.4 132.9 565.7 281.1 7.1
Peru 9.9 26.5 481.3 897.3 3.3
Chile 26.6 174.6 21.4 12.7 3.5
Colombia 12.0 19.3 23.5 23.7 10.6
 
Clearly, economic liberalisation did not generate a constellation of political constituents 
capable of imposing stable macroeconomic management within the state. Great increases in 
inflations rates (if not levels), proved very destabilising to a polity where low inflation was 
taken for granted.  
 
The perception that corruption increased during the liberalisation did enormous damage to 
political party legitimacy.54  The reasons for this increase are complex, though several factors 
have contributed. First, the insulated manner in which policy reforms were introduced ran 
contrary to the consultative processes that had characterised the political pacts upon which 
Venezuelan democracy was built since 1958.  Such insulation exacerbated factionalism within 
the governing party and between the government and opposition parties. This increase in 
factionalism increased the degree of ‘whistle blowing’, as those left out of decision-making 
used the corruption scandal as a weapon of political contestation. Moreover, the high levels of 
campaign financing by some of the prominent business groups for the Pérez presidency 
created animosities among rival contenders within AD, and fuelled allegations that Perez 
supporters would benefit from reforms. Rafael Caldera emerged as the leading political 
opponent of neo-liberal reforms in the early 1990s on an anti-corruption platform. He won the 
presidency in 1994. Second, the media increased and magnified the coverage of scandals, 
including the growing anti-corruption discourse among politicians and rival economic groups, 
                                                
51 C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.96. 
52 The rebellion of Pérez’s own party, along with the 1989 riots, contributed to the isolation of the Executive. 
Such isolation ‘signalled’ a legitimacy crisis for the government, which, in turn, emboldened further attacks 
against the state (Corrales, 2002, p.167).  The most notable examples were the two coup attempts in 1992 and the 
support among all political parties of the impeachment of Pérez (who was forced to resign in May 1993). 
53 B. Rowthorn, Capitalism, Conflict and Inflation, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971. 
54 M. Naím, ‘The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes’, Journal of Democracy, 12:2 (2001). 
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which increased public perception that corruption was increasing.55 The fact that few scandals 
ever resulted in arrests or penalties further fuelled public outrage. Finally, the decline real 
wages in combination with growing inequality quite likely reduced the tolerance the majority 
of people had for corruption and thus corruption scandals became politically more explosive 
and destabilising. 
 
Finally, the liberalisation period coincided with a decided disintegration in the legitimacy of 
the political party system and growing crisis of governability, which was manifested in the 
ensuing social unrest and political violence. The magnitude of the crisis in governability was 
evident with the decline in the legitimacy of the dominant governing political parties, as 
evidenced in dramatic increases in voter abstentionism. Since the consolidation of democratic 
elections in 1958, voter abstention rates averaged 7.6% in the five presidential elections in the 
period 1958-1983. From 1983, these rates increased dramatically: 18.1% in 1988, 39.8% in 
1993, and 32.3% in 1998. At the regional and local levels, the average level of abstention in 
state and local elections since the institution of decentralised elections in 1979 has been 
dramatically increasing as well.  The aggregate figures for state/local abstention rates are as 
follows: 1979 (27.1%), 1984 (40.7%). 1989 (55.0%), 1992 (52.8%), 1995 (53.9%).56  Apart 
from growing abstentionism, there are several other clear indicators of the decline in the 
legitimacy of the two dominant political parties since the consolidation of democracy in 1958. 
While one of the two parties has won the presidency from 1958 onwards; since 1993, neither 
party has held the presidency. There were also two abortive military coups in 1992, and the 
impeachment of Carlos Andres Pérez’s presidential term in 1994 on corruption charges.   
 
 
The Fragmentation of Political Parties, 1989-1998: Anti-Politics from within the Party 
System 
The failure of the political parties to meet economic challenges along with the growing 
polarization that neo-liberal reforms unleashed opened the space for the emergence of a 
political outsider.  There was nothing inevitable about the subsequent rise of Chávez.  
Prolonged economic crises do not inevitably lead to the disintegration of political 
representation through the party system. The confluence of several contingent factors 
contributed the demise of the party system.   
 
The first (and perhaps most important) factor was the decisions of the two most popular and 
influential leaders of Venezuela’s two main parties, Carlos Andres Pérez (AD) in 1989, and 
Rafael Caldera (COPEI) in 1993, to distance themselves from their parties.  Both leaders 
seized upon crisis situations to re-invent themselves as political outsiders. They did so with 
political messages and platforms that were the opposite of what they and their respective 
parties had established over the previous forty years.  Dramatic policy switches have been 
shown to be a destabilising event for fragile democracies.57 The decision of Pérez, leader of 
AD, to implement neo-liberal reforms through the use of non-party technocrats was 
detrimental in two ways.  First, Perez’s party-neglecting strategy accentuated factionalism 
                                                
55 Pérez Perdomo, ‘Corruption and Political Crisis’, in , in Goodman et al. (1995). 
56 The data on all abstention rates from 1958-1995 are taken from M. Grindle, Audacious Reforms, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, p.83. The figures for 1998 are taken from the Venezuelan National 
Commission of Elections, at http://www.Elecciones.eud.com/absten.ntm). 
57 S. Stokes, ‘What do policy switches tell us about democracy?’, in A. Przeworski et al. (eds.), Democracy, 
Accountability and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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within AD, and made implementing reforms politically contentious.58  Many AD party 
members blocked reforms in Congress and ultimately supported the impeachment of Pérez.  
Many AD members of Congress and of the Central Electoral Committee of AD considered 
Pérez’s actions a betrayal on two fronts: one for implementing neo-liberal policies, and two 
for naming very few AD party members to the Cabinet.   Secondly, the launching of a neo-
liberal economic went against the set of policies and symbols that defined AD’s legitimacy for 
decades. AD became the fundamental party as a champion of the working class and peasants, 
and built its reputation (however tarnished it had become) by advocating and implementing 
state-led developmentalism, the anti-imperialist struggles, and economic nationalism.  Neo-
liberal reforms launched by AD’s most established politician divided what AD stood for in the 
minds of their militants and sympathisers. The loss of AD’s party identity most likely 
contributed to the significant decline in party identification through the 1990s.59  
 
Rafael Caldera lost the nomination of the party he founded, COPEI, in 1993, to Oswaldo 
Alvarez Paz, one of the emerging regional politicians that decentralisation and direct state 
elections (legislated in 1989) created.  COPEI, traditionally the party that secured the middle-
class, orthodox Catholic and business vote, was opposed to Caldera’s opportunistic speech in 
Congress to defend the spirit of Chávez’s coup attempt; and opposed his intention to free 
Chávez from jail if elected president.  Caldera decided to break from COPEI, and ran on an 
anti-corruption, anti-system and anti-neoliberal campaign as a re-invented outsider. Caldera 
ran and won with a loose coalition of small left-wing parties under the umbrella of the new 
‘party’ Caldera founded, Convergencia.  Convergencia’s main ally in government would be 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which was an established, but small, left-wing party 
led by Teodoro Petkoft, an intellectual an ex-guerilla in the 1960s.  Caldera won with 30 
percent of the vote, while the candidates from AD, COPEI, and Causa R won between 20-23 
percent of the vote.60 
 
The short rise of Convergencia had serious consequences for the cohesion and legitimacy of 
the party system, hitherto controlled by AD and COPEI.  First, Caldera’s victory had an 
important signalling effect: the presidency could be obtained by running outside traditional 
party affiliation.  Secondly, Caldera split the COPEI vote, and thus divided what was a solid 
centre-right organised alternative to AD and civil society. COPEI did survive this fracture of 
its middle class and business support. Thirdly, this period sees a growing proliferation of 
political parties competing for the presidency and Congress. With the rise of Convergencia 
and the Causa R (a labour-union alternative to AD), representation of the centre-left vote 
became divided between these two ‘parties’, AD and MAS, at both the national and regional 
elections. In the period 1973-1988, the number of effective parties averaged 2.5 for the 
presidency and 3.3 for the Congress. In 1993, the number of effective parties competing for 
the presidency rose to 5.6 and the number of effective parties in Congress rose to 5.6, though 
AD and COPEI remained the two largest parties in both chambers. 
                                                
58 Corrales (2002). 
59 Ironically, in the first Pérez administration (1974-1978), the government attempted one of the largest state-led 
‘big push’ natural-resource-based industrialisation programs in Latin America, a program that was known as La 
Gran Venezuela (Karl, 1997, pp.143-160; Di John, 2004). For data on the loss of party identification through the 
1990s, see polls conducted by Datanalisis (various years). 
60 Causa R, led by presidential candidate Andres Velásquez, governor of the Bolivar state, was an emerging left-
wing party that had gained prominence by successfully challenging AD control of labour unions in the steel 
sector. Many rumours circulated that the Andres Velásquez, had won the 1993 election but was denied by fraud.  
On the rise and fall of the Causa R, see M. López Maya, ‘The Rise of  Causa R in Venezuela’, in D. Chalmers, et 
al. (eds.), The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
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The very negative and disappointing experience of government in the Caldera administration 
(1994-1998) further undermined the legitimacy of the party system. Caldera was, after all, 
trying to govern with political party input (including a rapprochement with AD), as opposed 
to Pérez, who was convinced that AD and the party system were generally moribund. Firstly, 
Caldera inherited one of the worst banking crises in 1994,61 and exacerbated the situation by 
shutting down the largest bank, Banco Latino, which was owned by an economic group close 
to the previous Perez administration.62 Secondly, there was a growing incoherence in state 
ministries as Caldera tried to accommodate the fractious coalition. There was no clear and 
coherent economic strategy. There were four economic plans initiated in Caldera’s 
government, and there was a large rotation of ministers.63 Third, worsening economic 
performance – as manifested in the continued increase in inflation, poverty, slow growth, 
declining investment and capital flight – created widespread disillusionment. Fourth, while the 
first two years of government paid lip service to the increase in attention in social 
programmes, the capacity of the state to spend money on projects became a big problem. 
Fifth, an important policy switch in 1996 toward a more neo-liberal economic programme, 
known as the Agenda Venezuela, led many to abandon their support for Caldera (whose 
popularity rating begins to decline significantly). Capital controls, instituted in 1994 (in the 
wake of the banking crisis) were lifted, trade was liberalised further, the oil industry was 
opened to significant foreign investment, and the severance-pay law (which had included 
retroactivity since 1936) was eliminated. These policy switches represented a betrayal to those 
lower-income sectors of the population, who had voted for Convergencia.  Finally, the 
decision of AD to support Caldera in this policy switch (AD was still the largest party in 
Congress, but with a reduced share in historical terms), further eroded the party’s identity as a 
champion of the less privileged sectors of the population.  Essentially, AD abandoned its 
image as a populist political party, which it had built since the 1930s, under the leadership of 
Romulo Betancourt.64 
 
Secondly, introduction of political decentralisation and fiscal federalism in the early-1990s 
also contributed to the fragmentation and loss of party discipline in the two main parties in the 
democratic pact, AD and COPEI. According to Penfold-Becerra, the post-1989 reforms that 
initiated direct election of mayors and governors and led to the devolution of state spending to 
states and municipalities lowered the barrier to entry of marginal and emerging parties and 
encouraged politicians within the two main parties to develop local alliances and assert 
autonomy from national party bosses.65  At the regional level, the share of 22 governorships 
that AD and COPEI controlled declined from 55 percent and 35 percent respectively in 1989 
to 34 percent and 21 percent respectively in 1998.   
 
Decentralisation, in the context of rapid economic reforms and economic crisis, along with 
relentless media coverage of corruption scandals concerning the state and political parties, 
provided opportunities for marginal but strong parties such as MAS, but more importantly 
embryonic and structurally weak political ‘parties’ such as Causa R and Proyecto Venezuela, 
and later MBR-200, to compete electorally at the state level.  Most of the emerging parties 
                                                
61 See Di John (2004). 
62 See Rodriguez (2002). 
63 R. de Krivoy, Colaspo del Sistema Bancaria Venezolana de 1994,  Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 2002. 
64 On the populist nature of AD in the period 1940-1960, see S. Ellner, ‘The Heyday of Radical Populism in 
Venezuela and its Aftermath’, in M. Conniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America, Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1999. 
65 M. Penfold-Becerra, ‘Federalism and Institutional Change in Venezuela’, paper presented at the American 
Political Science Annual Meeting, Boston, 2002. 
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built their power bases at the regional level. Andres Velásquez, Bolivar state’s governor from 
Causa R (1989-93), ran for the presidency based on his well-deserved reputation of running a 
successful administration. In Carabobo state, a centre of industrial activity, Henrique Salas 
Romer broke with COPEI during the 1992 regional elections, and created a state-based party, 
Proyecto Carabobo, and won the governorship in 1992 and 1998.  Salas Romer, who changed 
the name of the party to Proyecto Venezuela, came second in the 1998 presidential elections 
running under this improvised name (with last-minute support of AD and COPEI after they 
realised their own candidates were polling below 5 percent each).  
 
The emergence of federalism drastically changes the alliance strategies followed by political 
parties. AD, COPEI and MAS all developed alliance-bloc systems with a strategy to protect 
their regional leaderships.66  In 1989, AD established alliances with an average of 2.18 parties 
per state for the 22 gubernatorial elections. By 1998, AD allied with an average of 7.5 parties 
per state.  In 1989, COPEI established an average of 5.57 alliances with parties and 9 by 1998. 
The electoral premium COPEI obtained form these alliances rose from an average of 7 
percent in 1989 to 20.6 percent in 1998.  In 1998, Chávez’s party, Movimiento Quinta 
Republica (MVR) MBR-200, was gaining strength at the regional level and by 1998, on the 
coat tails of Chávez’s victory, won 17.7 percent of the governorships.  What is telling about 
these regionally based parties is that their growth never expanded to the national level in terms 
of party organisation.  Moreover, the growth in political alliances at the regional level 
increased the degree of factionalism of the governing level, which may account for the 
disappointing performance of local government in the 1990s.67 
 
At the national level, the central committees of COPEI and AD were less able to control party 
member, and particularly within COPEI, the central committee became an empty shell by the 
mid-1990s.68 A telling indication of the effect that decentralisation had on the presidency 
occurred in 1993 when Rafael Caldera, founding member of COPEI, decided to found a new 
political movement, Covergencia, and won the presidency that year opposing political parties 
and neo-liberal economic reform: 
One main motivation that Caldera had in abandoning COPEI was his failure to 
control an increasingly decentralised and fragmented party structure, a situation 
that hindered his capacity to construct a political base win the presidential 
candidacy within the party.69  
 
The decision of Pérez, leader of AD, to implement neo-liberal reforms through a party-
neglecting strategy,70 the subsequent decision of Rafael Caldera, founding member of COPEI, 
to abandon his party affiliation in favour of re-inventing himself as an honest ‘outsider’, and 
Caldera’s decision to free Chávez from jail in 1994 were contingent outcomes. The 
consequences of these strategies emerge clearly in the period 1993-2000: there was a 
substitution of political parties by loose coalitions by political movements with superficial 
tag-names with little organisational structure or capacity (Convergenica, Proyecto Venezuela, 
Proyecto Irene etc.), which was instrumental in the growing voter volatility in the period.  To 
adapt the logic of Hirschman, the strategic decision of key leaders to ‘exit’ their party 
structure, produced a fracturing of political representation, or ‘voice’, across and within 
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income and class groups.71  This, as Gutierrez points out in the Peruvian case, led ultimately 
to the fracture between politics and society.72 
 
Much further research is needed as to why political parties fail to reform to meet challenges 
and why the institution of reforms proves so destabilising in some context as opposed to 
others. Economic crises, growth in informality, the rise of television, etcetera, were all 
features of the Argentinean, Brazilian, Chilean, Uruguayan, Mexican and Colombian milieu, 
but have not led (at least not the same extent) to the collapse of either their state institutions or 
their political party systems (however fragmented they may have become). Moreover, there is 
not a necessary connection between decentralisation and fiscal federalism on the one hand, 
and political party collapse and state breakdown on the other.  For instance, Colombia 
introduced decentralisation reforms at the same time as Venezuela and has not experienced a 
collapse in its two main political parties or noticeable declines in state capacity in the period 
1990-2002.  One possible reason for this may be that the party system in Colombia was much 
more fragmented and regionalised compared with the more centralised party system in 
Venezuela.  Secondly, Venezuelan political parties relied much more than their Colombian 
counterparts on state intervention to develop patron-client networks. Decentralisation, in this 
case, would disrupt patronage patterns in a centralised, hierarchical party system more than in 
a fragmented one like Colombia.73  These differences with Colombia highlight the importance 
of considering the nature of initial structural conditions in developing hypotheses on the cause 
of political party fragmentation and collapse and its relationship to declines in state capacity, 
and the subsequent rise of anti-politics. The next section examines the rise of a consummate 
political outsider, Hugo Chávez, and the roots of his radical ideology and platforms.   
 
 
The Ideological Roots of the Chavista Movement 
The radical nature of chavista anti-politics has a long trajectory.  While spending two years in 
jail after the failed military coup in 1992, news of the revolutionary project he had been 
working on with colleagues in the military emerged. Venezuelan junior officers led by Chávez 
formed in a conspiratorial group known as the Movimeniento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 
(MBR-200) in 1982.  This group was among many in the country that began to question the 
viability and effectiveness of Venezuela’s pacted democracy and the existing distribution of 
wealth and privileges.74  They met in clandestine cells to study military and national history, 
were critical of the growth in corruption scandals, and were intent on influencing political 
processes.75  They were particularly interested in the rule of nationalist, left-wing military 
leaders such as Omar Torrijos in Panama, and General Velasco Alvaro in Peru. 
 
The military education offered in Venezuela in the 1970s also helped play an important role 
the commitment of middle-level officers to political activism. With the decline in guerrilla 
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warfare in the 1960s, the government implemented the ‘Andres Bello Plan’, which enrolled 
young officers in Venezuelan universities as an alternative to military institutions.76  The 
experience of meeting and engaging with university students and taking courses in social 
sciences (at a time when dependency theory, and nationalist development policy were the 
mainstream) politicised a great many officers in their formative years.  
 
The MBR-200 was committed to forming a ‘civilian-military’ alliance.  Chávez particularly 
was an avid history reader, and his thinking and philosophy were based on three figures in 
Venezuelan history: Simon Bolivar, Ezequiel Zamora, and Simon Rodriguez.  From Bolivar, 
Chávez sought to re-fan the revolutionary flames of seeking political unification of Latin 
America through the process of developing internal, and indigenous, forms of development in 
each country.  “A valid project for the twenty-first century”, Chávez believes, “is to bring 
together at a conference the balkanised countries of Latin America”.77  Re-inventing 
nationalism and regional integration, themes that were once at the forefront of ECLA thinking 
in the 1960s, formed part of the Bolivarian revolutionary project.  From Zamorra, Chávez and 
the MBR-200 developed an impassioned advocacy of agrarian reform. Zamorra was a popular 
nineteenth-century caudillo who had a strong sense of social solidarity with the landless 
peasant.  Zamorra organised civilian support for his army be promising agrarian reform during 
the brutal Federal War in the mid-1800s. His appeal to the insurgent peasantry was based on 
three slogans: a) ‘land and free men’; b) general elections; and c) hatred of the oligarchy.  
Simon Rodriguez, a contemporary of Bolivar, was an educator and philosopher, who 
championed the importance of universal education, and who was particularly passionate about 
the importance of integrating indigenous peoples into the emerging education system. He also 
wrote passionately against racism, and advocated far-reaching agrarian reforms. In the course 
of travelling in the West Indies, Rodriguez changed his name to Robinson. Upon returning to 
Venezuela, after a quarter century in Europe, he wrote: “My project is to colonise America 
with its own inhabitants.  I want to rehabilitate the indigenous race and prevent it from being 
exterminated”.  The so-called ‘Robinsonian’ mission of education forms an integral part of 
Chávez’s revolutionary project and became one of the principal government missions in 
education in the period 2000-2004 (discussed below). 
 
During the 1980s, the MBR-200 became closely connected with activists and leaders of leftist 
parties that were defeated in the guerrilla struggles of the 1960s. The most influential contact 
was with the Partido de la Revolución Venezolana (PRV), led by Douglass Bravo.  Other 
important links were developed with left-wing parties, including La Causa R, and Bandera 
Roja (Red Flag).  Most of these left-wing groups shared with the Bolivarianos the goal of a 
civilian-military alliance for the purpose of promoting revolutionary change.78 Apart from 
links with guerrilla activists, the MBR-200 made numerous meetings and links with left-wing 
intellectuals, academic, and activists. These included members of the Frente Patriótica 
(Patriotic Front) such as Luis Miquilena, Manuel Quijada, José Vicente Rangel, and university 
figures who were stepped in dependency, Marxist and post-Keynesian thinking such as Jorge 
Giordani, Luis Fuemmayor, Hector Navarro, and Adina Bastides.79  All assumed prominent 
positions after 1998 in Chávez’s administration. 
 
In the 1990s, the Bolivarian movement grew significantly.  One of the more influential figures 
to join was Kleber Ramirez, a former guerrilla who formulated basic proposals for the rebel 
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movements programme of government.  Ramirez argues that the party structure was 
ineffective and worn out.  He called for strengthening of the national executive, elimination of 
state legislatures, and the reorganisation of municipal government, which would form the 
pillar of the nation’s new democracy.80  In 1997, the MBR-200 became the Movimeiento 
Quinta Republica (MVR) at its Congress in Valencia, where it abandoned electoral 
abstentionism.   At this point many disillusioned members of AD and COPEI joined the 
MVR.  The rapid nature of the movement’s group added many diverse ideological currents 
and was to be a source of factionalism that was to characterise the MVR during the Chávez 
regime. 
 
Finally, the platform presented by the Polo Patriótico (PPT), the main political umbrella group 
of the chavistas, for the 1998 elections provides an important source of information on the 
economic project and thinking of the chavista movement.  The team that elaborated the 
document were to form some of the principal cabinet members in Chávez’s government.  
Moreover, extensive interviews with Chávez undertaken by Agustín Blanco Muñoz, and 
published under the title El Comandante Habla, also provides a rich source on the economic 
thinking on the leading chavistas.81. 
 
There are several themes that define the thinking of the chavistas.  First, the principal 
problems identified are inflation, hunger, lack of security and poverty.  The mass of these 
problems, according to leading chavistas, is the capture of the democratic system by political 
cliques and small, but powerful, economic groups.82  This diagnostic is similar to the negative 
impact that distributional coalitions play in the analysis of economic stagnation provided by 
Olson.83  The Constitutuent Assembly organised in 1999 addresses this problem directly 
through its advocacy of a more participatory democratic system. A second problem identified 
is the concentration of production of the Venezuelan economy.  Chavistas point out that 
production is concentrated in three ways: a) by regions, in the North-Central regions around 
Caracas and Valencia; b) by ownership, in the sense that few economic groups control a high 
relative share of production; and c) by product, in the sense that the economy is vulnerable as 
a mono-exporter of oil.  Third, political transformation, in particular promoting direct 
democracy and reducing the power of the legislature, is given priority over economic 
strategies.  Poverty is seen primarily as a social problem, not an economic one, and there is no 
discussion that the distribution of income, or stagnant economic growth, are the main 
contributors to poverty.  While there are references to the unequal access to oil revenues in 
Venezuelan society, the focus on the importance of social programmes, and the lack of any 
coherent strategy to revive investment, growth or export diversification strategies, is 
illuminating.  In particular, there is no discussion in the Polo Patriótica’s economic platform 
of the competitive advantage of Venezuelan exports, which would require large-scale plants, 
itself a source of increasing inequalities in terms of asset ownership.  Instead, the platform 
focuses extensively on the need to provide basic necessities in consumer products and public 
services, and the role of the government in maintaining control of the ‘commanding heights’ 
of the economy in the minerals and energy sectors.  There are references to the importance of 
promoting large-scale industry, finance and banking, but they are downplayed and it is not 
clear the extent to which these industries should remain private.  Finally, the chavista 
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programme supports fiscal balance and is essentially orthodox in orientation.  The reduction 
of the fiscal deficit is seen as the principal way to combat inflation, which chavistas see as 
important in maintaining the purchasing power of the poor. 
 
In sum, the rise of chavismo is a history of an alliance between radical military thinkers and 
former guerrilla leaders searching for a way to challenge the existing structures of political 
and economic power.  It is only through an examination of the intellectual history surrounding 
this group that it is possible to understand why anti-politics in the period 1998-2004 takes a 
decidedly more nationalistic and radical turn than in other Latin American cases.  Moreover, 
the emphasis on the political over the economic contains many contradictions that will 
become the source not only of fierce opposition, but will also negatively affect the coherence 
and administrative viability of the policies proposed. 
 
 
Empowering Anti-politics: The Rise of the Chavistas and Constitutional Change  
During the electoral campaign of 1998, Chávez and the MVR campaigned on an anti-
corruption, anti-neoliberal, anti-political establishment discourse that called for the 
transformation of the political system and the Constitution.  The promise for a Constituent 
Assembly provided the focal point of Chávez’s electoral pledge. Growing levels of poverty 
and the policy switch to a neo-liberal agenda (in the form of the Agenda Venezuela) during 
the Caldera administration severely reduced the popularity and legitimacy of the traditional 
political parties. The MVR refused to make any alliances with traditional parties; instead the 
MVR constructed a broad alliance with new and alternative movements, which together 
became known as the Polo Patriótica (PP, Patriotic Pole).  The MVR (the Fifth Republic 
Movement), the electoral organisation of the MBR-200, was designed to protect the fragile 
structure of the MBR-200 from the unpredictability of the electoral process.84  MBR-200 
leaders did not want their ideological orientation compromised by the real politics of 
constructing electoral alliances.  The fragility of anti-politics originates here in the divorce of 
economic and political programmes from economic and political organisations. The MVR 
was thus conceived as a tool of the party to incorporate independent parties and groups, whose 
only shared concern with the MBR-200 was their support of Chávez’s presidential 
candidacy.85  The electoral success in 1998, however, allowed the MVR, with its acute 
factionalism, to take the vanguard in government, and the MB-200 loses control over 
programmatic politics after the election.   
 
The main strategy of the election campaign was mass rallies. The anti-politics discourse was 
evident in Chávez’s refusal to make alliances with traditional parties. Perhaps his most 
effective tactic was the string of fiery, even messianic speeches that incorporated the term ‘el 
pueblo’ (the people) into his political discourse, and the dramatic way he created bonds with 
the poor.  Much of the middle and upper class opposition to Chávez continually 
underestimated the importance of his message and passion. Chávez is a mestizo who comes 
from mixed Indian and African heritage.  He appealed to the less privileged and unorganised 
poor groups as both economically excluded and pointed out that economic exclusion occurred 
mainly among mestizos, like him. His appeals to the masses not only as a group that had been 
forgotten in the past decade, but that those who were most affected happened to be of similar 
racial origins to him.  The appeal to less privileged groups thus consisted of an appeal to the 
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prevailing anger along class and racial lines.  Traditionally, Venezuelan presidents came from 
European ancestry.  Chávez linked ‘the people’ to the great achievements of the nineteenth 
century, particularly their role in the bloody war of independence, and the Federal War, 
invariably painting el pueblo as a brave, noble, beautiful, and valiant – the protagonist in 
history.86 
 
The role of television in the campaign was also a crucial medium for Chávez (and his main 
adversary, Salas Romer).  While television undoubtedly provided the opportunity for 
politicians to reach beyond political party organisations in winning elections, it is well know 
that, since 1973, Venezuelan campaigns were among the most expensive in the developing 
world because TV advertising was a principal medium to get across a party’s message. 
Nevertheless, by 1998, surveys indicated that 64 percent of Venezuelans used television as the 
main source of their information about politics, 22 percent use newspapers as the primary 
medium to inform themselves about politics and 9 percent rely on radio.87  The role of 
television as an enabling factor in Chávez’s years as president is more problematic since the 
period 2001-2004 sees the private TV stations waging a fierce anti-chavista campaign to 
persuade voters to remove him from office, though Chávez used his access to the state TV 
station to address the nation each Sunday in five-hour encounters with supporters. 
 
Upon winning the election in 1998, Chávez took advantage of his enormous popularity to 
transform the political system and economic policy. The first objective was to call for a 
Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution. This would not be an easy task for several 
reasons. First, voter abstentionism was 36 percent, which was higher than the previous three 
presidential elections. In historical terms, this was not necessarily a mandate for wide-ranging 
changes. Secondly, Chávez received most of his electoral support from lower income groups, 
who had traditionally had much less political voice than the middle- and upper-income groups 
who voted for Salas Romer.  Thirdly, AD, COPEI and other traditional parties still retained 
control of the Congress, most state and municipal assemblies and had traditionally dominated 
the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, and the National Electoral Council. 
 
In these first, few months, Chávez’s ability to manipulate power, and intimidate, divide and 
conquer the opposition, were masterful.  Without this tactical ability, it is doubtful whether a 
Constituent Assembly would have been called.88  He appeared on his weekly call-in radio 
show, Aló Presidente, to help sway public opinion. A referendum in April 1999 approved 
elections for the Constituent Assembly by a wide margin (though absentionism was very high 
at 62 percent).  Chávez and his supporters threatened from the beginning to eliminate 
Congress if the work of the Constituent Assembly was obstructed.  The ultimate success of 
Chávez in forging an agreement to proceed with elections for the Constituent Assembly in 
July 1999 depended on at least three factors.  First, Chávez had a relatively high popularity 
rating that ranged between 60-70 percent in the first year of office.  Second, there were many 
anti-Chavista groups, including business groups and some of the private media that had 
backed him in the election.  Third, Chávez and the MVR could count on the solid support of 
the poorer sectors of the population. Chávez, in his radio programmes and numerous 
appearances on the state television channel, Venezolana de Televisión, promised passionately 
to protect the rights and support squatters, the unemployed, retired workers and pensioners.  
This created enormous expectations but also galvanised the poor to march in favour of 
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constitutional reform.89  Because of the groundswell of popular support for Chávez, the 
MVR’s threats that they would mobilise ‘the street’ to against adversaries was a credible 
threat. Fourth, the opposition parties were at an historic low in popularity and legitimacy.  
This was reflected in the poor presidential election showing as well as polls indicating that 
party identification for AD and COPEI below 10 percent.90  Indeed, many traditional party 
members refrained from running candidates for the July 1999 elections for the Constituent 
Assembly.91  Finally, Chávez and the MVR benefited from extensive support within the 
military.  With embryonic, factionalist and fragile nature of MVR, and the lack of MVR 
penetration of labour unions, Chávez needed the military as a principal political ally. He used 
executive control over funds and public jobs to appoint military officers to high-level 
positions within the state, particularly the oil industry.  Moreover, Chávez channelled large 
amount of funds into public works programmes in sanitation, health, indigent care, public 
transport and housing through the armed forces.  Thousands of military personnel were 
deployed in this programme.  These programmes delivered short-run benefits to poor 
neighbourhoods and increased the profile and popularity of the military.  Finally, the 
extension of suffrage to the military enhanced their support.  The support of the military 
probably allowed Chávez and the MVR to sanction and even identify with street 
demonstrations in support of the Constituent Assembly without worrying about a coup.92 
 
The MVR and its allies dominated the election to the CA, gaining 123 of the 131 seats.  This 
paved the way for the rewriting of the Constitution.  The major changes have been the subject 
of extensive analysis.93  The main changes to the political and economic landscape are as 
follows.  First, in classic populist style, the name of the country was changed to ‘The 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’.  Second, the powers of the executive were strengthened 
and the Congress weakened.  The Assembly created a unicameral Congress, eliminated 
congressional input in military promotions (and reduced it in the case of judges) and gave the 
president more extensive power to dissolve Congress and re-enforced the ability of the 
president to pass emergency laws. Many analysts refer to these measures as transforming 
Venezuela from a ‘presidentialist’ to a ‘hyper-presidentialist’ polity.  Third, the constitution 
promoted a more participatory democracy with the intent of giving ‘the people’ a 
‘protagonist’ role, which downgraded the importance of intermediary organisations and 
elected representatives. The creation of citizen assemblies, citizen power groups, and the 
facilitation of referenda (including one that allows for the removal of elected public officials) 
were emphasised.  Representative democracy was downgraded. No better reflection of this is 
Article 67 of the Constitution, which eliminated public funding of political parties. In sum, the 
institutional changes at the level of the Constitution both strengthened executive power while 
enhancing the possibility of direct participation.  
 
While constitutional changes were wrought with conflicts both within the chavista movement 
and outside, the popular sectors and other supporters of chavismo felt enormous vindication 
and pride in the even small levels of consultation and the symbolism that direct democracy 
                                                
89 Most of 1999 was filled with tense street demonstrations all seeking to have their input into the realisation of 
the Constituent Assembly elections and in the rewriting of the Constitution (López Maya, 2003). 
90 Datanalisis, 2003. In the 1980s, the portion of the population that declared themselves either a member or 
supporter of AD averaged 25 percent.   Between June 1998 and July, 1999, the share of the population that 
identified with AD declined from 19 percent to 4.0 percent; in the same period, the share of the population that 
identified with COPEI declined from 11 percent to 3.0 percent (Datanalisis, 2003). 
91 Ellner (2001); McCoy (1999); Carrasequero et al. (eds.), Venezuela en transición: elecciones y democracia 
1998-2000, Caracas: CDB Publicaciones, 2001. 
92 Ellner (2001). 
93 See Carrasquero et al. (2001); Ellner & Hellinger (2003). 
 24
meant for underprivileged groups, who felt neglected or used by the traditional political 
parties.  The CA raised the level of political consciousness in Venezuela to unprecedented 
levels as even opposition groups admit.  It became de rigueur to carry around a miniature blue 
copy of the Constitution.  In the wake of this euphoria, both Chávez and MVR and allies won 
landslide victories in the ‘mega-elections’, which elected all levels of government in 
December 2000.  Chávez defeated his fellow coup conspirator, General Francisco Arias 
Cardenas,94 by a similar margin to his victory in 1998.  This period represented the end of the 
honeymoon for Chávez, as the economic and social emergency laws he decreed in 2001 
polarised the nation further and led to increasing factionalism within his own movement. 
 
 
Assessing the Chávez Era: Economic and Social Indicators 1998-2004 
The social and political polarisation of the period 1998-2004 greatly affected the economic 
performance of the Venezuelan economy.  What is interesting is that despite the continued 
decline in economic growth and investment, increases in capital flight, unemployment and 
poverty, Chávez has remained, by a long distance, the most popular politician in the country, 
and consolidated his hold on power with a landslide victory in the 2004-referendum call.95  
The chavista movement has always maintained the fierce loyalty of the lower-income groups.  
There is no doubt that increases in oil prices dramatically increased the possibility of fiscal 
expansion and social spending in the period 2001-2004.  However, the effect of oil on regime 
stability and a president’s popularity has been indeterminate in the Venezuelan case. Chávez 
began his regime with oil prices at historic lows in the first two years and managed to promote 
constitutional reforms. Moreover, the fierce opposition to Chávez in the period 2002-2004 
undermined much of the oil windfall effect, as there were increases in poverty and 
unemployment. In contrast to the Fujimori case, the consolidation of anti-politics in 
Venezuela coincides with drastic declines in economic performance.  Fujimori presided over 
the largest increase in economic growth in Peru for thirty years, yet his reign in power ended 
in disgrace, amidst large-scale corruption and military abuse charges.96  Chávez has survived 
and consolidated power despite much fiercer opposition from the media, middle-class and 
business groups, and opposition in parts of the military and tacit US backing for a failed coup 
attempt on 11 April 2002. This period clearly demonstrates once again that there is no 
determinant relationship between economic performance and regime sustainability. Moreover, 
in periods of institutional transformation – where rules of the game and political access to the 
state are under contention and/or undergo path changes-economic performance indicators may 
tell us less about regime viability than in times of ‘normal’ politics (where political 
competition occurs under agreed rules of the game). 
 
As indicated in Table 5, the Chávez era has seen a dramatic decline in economic growth in 
both the non-oil economy and in manufacturing, even when compared to the poor economic 
performance of the liberalisation era, 1990-98. Much of the poor performance owes to the 
two-month national strike (which included the suspension of oil production) in December 
2002 called by the opposition to Chávez.  In the first trimester of 2003, GDP fell 25 percent 
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compared to the previous year.  The political and economic opposition also negatively 
affected investment levels.  While total investment increased by an average of 6 percent in 
2000-01, investment fell dramatically by 22 percent in 2002, and 38.9 percent in 2003.  Such 
an economic depression negatively affected the demand for labour.  Unemployment averaged 
over 15 percent in the period 1998-2003 (compared with an average of 9.6 percent in the 
period 1993-98).  The factorial share of labour remains very low at 34.8 percent, which 
implies that, in the formal sector, exploitation of labour was at elevated levels in historical 
terms (see Table 3). The informal economy increased to 55.5 percent in the period 1998-2003 
(compared with 46 percent in the period 1993-98). Together these figures suggest that income 
distribution probably worsened slightly, at least within the formal sector of the economy.  The 
declining influence of labour unions and Chávez’s antagonistic stance toward the CTV meant 
that there was little scope for bargaining for increases in the share of the surplus being 
generated. In any case, the demand for formal labour declines to such an extent that little 
would have been expected in that front. 
 
Table 5: Growth Trends in the Venezuelan Economy, 1990-2002 
Source: Baptista, (1997); Central Bank of Venezuela, Annual Reports, various years 
 
Average Annual Growth Rates,* % 
Non-oil GDP Manufacturing 
1990-1998 2.3 1.5
1998-2002 -1.9 -5.0
2003 -8.1 -8.0
* All output series in 1984 bolivares 
 
However, the poorest sectors of the economy, Chávez’s basis of support are, in large part, in 
the informal economy and in the shantytowns of the country.  There are material reasons as to 
why their support unwavered beyond Chávez’s charismatic, symbolic, inspirational appeal to 
such groups.  Firstly, there was a reduction in the annual average rate of inflation in the period 
1998-2003 to 24.6 percent, down from 66.6 percent in the period 1993-1998. This likely 
arrested the decline in purchasing power of the lower-income groups.  This was maintained 
through prices controls on food, and, particularly after 2002, the maintenance of an 
overvalued exchange rate.  Secondly, amidst economic decline the poverty rate actually 
declined significantly compared with the last years of the Caldera administration.  The 
poverty rate declined from an annual average of 66 percent in the period 1993-1998 to 56 
percent in the period 1998-2002.97   This, in turn, is due to the increase in a re-shifting of 
resources in favour of social spending. The share of social spending in GDP increased from an 
average of 7.5 percent in the period 1997-1998, to 11 percent in the period 2000-2004.98  This 
represents a 46 percent increase in the share of social spending. Moreover, increased oil prices 
permitted the government to engage in fiscal expansion despite declines in private sector 
investment. Two aspects of this social spending are noteworthy.  First, the executive-run 
government missions (many with the aid of the military, and, to a much lesser extent, Cuban 
educators and physicians) in health, education, housing, and infrastructure spending in 
shantytowns have improved living conditions in many poor areas.  Public spending in health 
increased from 3.2 percent of GDP in 1998 to 4.8 percent of GDP in the period 2002-2004. 
One indicator of the effects of this spending is a decline in infant mortality from an annual 
average of 22 deaths per 1,000 live births in the period 1996-98 to 17.6 per 1,000 live births in 
the period 2000-2002.  Because the lower income groups use public services, this 
improvement in public health was bound to increase the legitimacy of chavismo among the 
                                                
97 F. Rodríguez, ‘Las Conequencias de la Revolución Bolivariana’, Nueva Economia, 19 (2003). 
98 INE, Logros Equilibrio Social y Economico, Caracas: República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2004. 
 26
poor.  Wealthier groups, who generally use private sector services, never mentioned any of 
these gains while supporting the overthrow of Chávez. Secondly, agrarian reform laws and the 
distribution of state lands to landless groups in the central and south-western plains states 
have contributed to the reduction in rural poverty, and given the rural and urban poor hope 
that more opportunities will arise.99   
 
Several deficiencies in the Chávez administration need to be noted.  First, there has been little 
attempt to build the administration in terms of organisational capacity or build political links 
between ministries and interest groups.  Much of the spending remains in the hands of the 
executive.100  There are several reasons for this.  First, the chavistas do not draw on 
bureaucratic personnel associated with AD and COPEI and thus lose out on some talented 
pools of labour. As such, the armed forces and immigration of Cuban health and education 
workers fill many of the gaps needed.101 As well, the growing factionalism within the chavista 
movement has created similar problems to bureaucratic incoherence that plagued the Caldera 
administration. Second, there is a lack of any coherent production or export strategy. Much of 
this has to do with the antagonistic relationship Chávez has maintained vis-à-vis many big 
business groups (though relations have improved as Chávez has consolidated power after the 
2004 referendum). However, another important factor is the ideology of chavismo, which is 
focused on supporting small-scale businesses and cooperatives through micro-credit schemes. 
This strategy makes Venezuela more dependent on oil.  This may be the reason behind the 
very pragmatic position Chávez takes in terms of oil policy.  The Venezuelan state, while 
trying to ensure the state appropriates a greater share of oil revenues (which had been 
declining in the 1990s),102 has made it clear to the Bush administration that it intends to 
continue exporting to the US, and has made plans for joint ventures with Exxon-Mobile and 
Texaco to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fields.  Finally, the prospects of sustaining effective 
social spending and the development of a sustainable production strategy will depend on the 
extent the administration institutionalises the gains of a radical episode in anti-politics.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The return of party politics in Venezuela seems remote at the moment. Firstly, the 
Constitution reduces the limits of political party financing. The failures of the opposition to 
overthrow Chávez have exhausted middle-class opposition.  Opposition politics has, in the 
past three years, taken place through the media and street demonstrations, some of which have 
turned violent, though the level of political violence in Venezuela remains low in comparative 
terms. AD and COPEI remain moribund; and the parties that have replaced them, with sham 
names such as Primera Justicia (First Justice) and Coordinator Democratica (Democratic 
Coordinator), are run by middle- and upper-class groups who lack organisation and have no 
alternate plan of government.  These political movements have disintegrated quickly in the 
wake of the failure of the referendum to oust Chávez in August 2004.  While oil makes the 
state worth struggling over, the ability of the Chávez regime to construct a developmental 
state and diversify export production will likely enhance the prospects of the return to party 
democracy. Without an increase in the size and productivity of the formal economy, it is 
                                                
99 G. Wilpert, ‘Collision in Venezuela’, New Left Review, 21 (2003). 
100 See article by PDVSA head of the state oil company, a Chávez loyalist, Ali Rodriguez (‘The Main Obstacle is 
the Adminsitrative Structure of the Venezuelan State’, Venezuelaanalysis.com, 24 July 2004). 
101 One of the biggest losses of talent occurred by the ill-advised attempt to oil sector executives and workers to 
strike in December 2002.  Chávez rightly fired 18,000 employees associated with this attempt, but replacing 
them will take time.   
102 B. Mommer, ‘Subversive Oil’, in Ellner & Hellinger (2003). 
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unlikely that the material base of meaningful party politics will re-emerge in Venezuela in the 
foreseeable future.  This does not preclude the possibility that imaginative and visionary 
politicians, such as Chávez, will contribute to the reconstruction of coalitions in support of 
political parties, despite the difficult socio-economic context in which Venezuela finds itself.   
 28
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